The Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal and insider dealing - a note on the tribunal and the first three concluded cases by Fabri, David

The Malta Stock 
Exchange Tribunal and 
Insider Dealing 
-a note on the Tribunal and the first three concluded cases 
THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS to highlight some significant aspects of the first three cases submitted to the 
Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal. All these three cases have now been concluded and at the time of writing no 
proceedings are pending before this Tribunal. This may therefore be a good occasion to review the performance 
of this Tribunal and the effectiveness of our insider dealing law. 
0 ur first ever rules on insider dealing were 
introduced by the Malta 
inal law. It establishes an exten-
sive number of insider offences, 
listing a series of circumstances 
when such offences may be com-
mitted. It does not provide any 
civil remedy for losses suffered 
consequent to a breach of the 
insider dealing provisions . 
Stock Exchange Act of 1990. The 
establishment of the Borsa and a 
regulatory framework for the list-
ing and trading of shares would 
have been incomplete without 
clear rules prohibiting and pun-
ishing insider dealing. The Act 
also established the Malta Stock 
Exchange Tribunal (MSET). This 
was assigned a rather mixed bag of 
roles to play, including jurisdic-
tion to investigate suspected cases 
of insider dealing, a role which 
may have overlapped with the reg-
ulatory functions of the Council. 
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The Tribunal consists of a 
Chairman, who must have a legal 
qualification, and two other mem-
bers. It is appointed for a period 
of three years. It is currently com-
posed of the same persons consti-
tuting the Financial Services 
Tribunal (FST) . Established under 
the Banking Act of 1994, some of 
the relevant provisions were clear-
ly modelled on the rules governing 
the MSET in an evident attempt to 
bring the two tribunals structural-
ly closer together. 
David Fabri lec tures 
Under the 1990 Act , the princi-
pal function of the Tribunal is to 
investigate allegations or suspi-
cions of insider dealing or other 
"irregular practices in Exchange 
dealings" on the Malta Stock 
on financial services reg-
ulation and consumer 
legis lation at the 
University of Malta and 
is a frequent writer on 
regulatory topics; he is 
responsible f or legal and 
European Union aff airs 
at the Malta Financial 
Services Centre. The last two of the three cases so 
far determined by the MSET con-
cerned suspected insider dealing. 
One may disclose at the outset that 
Exchange. The MSET has no 
criminal jurisdiction, and there-
fore cannot fine or send wrongdoers to prison . It 
is the only authority which has an express power 
under Maltese law to order persons found crimi-
nally guilty of insider dealing to pay compensa-
tion to an injured party who has suffered finan-
cial loss . The ordinary law, including our civil , 
commercial and company laws , does not contain 
any similar provision anywhere. No such award 
has ever been given. 
The Insider Dealing Act of 1994 makes no ref-
erence to the MSET, which is rather strange and 
unhelpful. This Act is largely a part of the crim-
in neither of these two cases was insider dealing 
established. This means that ten years after the 
introduction of the first ever insider dealing rules 
in Maltese law in the 1990 Act and eight years 
from the adoption of the Insider Dealing Act of 
1994, no Maltese court , Tribunal or administra-
tive body has ever established that an insider 
dealing act was committed in Malta . In these cir-
cumstances, one concludes either that no insider 
dealing has ever been committed in relation to 
dealings on the Malta Stock Exchange, or that 
nobody has yet been caught doing it. 
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TA' 
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Once no criminal activity was established, these 
cases lack that certain dramatic aura. This 
notwithstanding, the Tribunal's decisions remain 
interesting for a number of reasons. They once 
again confirm that Directors remain the primary 
insiders par excellence, and consequently the 
most exposed to possible suspicions on insider 
wrongdoing. As the main depositaries of compa-
ny secrets, they are expected not to make abusive 
profits from them by directly transacting in com-
pany shares or assisting others in unlawful ways 
to do so. When they act in breach of these oblig-
ations, they may find themselves having to render 
an account to the Tribunal. The Tribunal may 
then recommend the taking of administrative 
measures against the wrongdoer and it may 
report its findings to the Police. 
The following is a brief summary of the deci-
sions given in respect of the first three cases so far 
submitted to the MSET in terms of section 26 of 
the Malta Stock Exchange Act 1990. In several 
respects, these decisions ought to be recognized 
as an additional important source of law. They 
are helping in the evolution of the law on insider 
dealing and market abuse. Their conclusions 
offer useful guidance for future cases that may 
arise. 
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Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal 
decision · Case number 1 
Prolonged suspension of trading of a listed security; 
minority rights; case withdrawn by joint declaration of 
the parties. 
The very first case that had been submitted to 
the Tribunal revolved around a complaint by the 
minority shareholders of a leading listed bank, 
the then Mid Med Bank plc , against the pro-
longed suspension by the Malta Stock Exchange 
of all trading in the bank's shares pending the 
proposed acquisition of the majority sharehold-
ing from government by HSBC. 
When the proceedings were opened in 1999, 
the Council of the Exchange had immediately 
pleaded that the Tribunal had no competence to 
hear the case . It argued that the phrase "alleged 
or suspected irregular practices on the 
Exchange" , used in the Malta Stock Exchange Act 
section dealing with the Tribunal's competence , 
could not reasonably be interpreted to extend to 
regulatory decisions of the Council itself. The 
Exchange tried to convince the Tribunal that the 
phrase under review applied exclusively to the 
behaviour of stockbrokers or investors, and was 
not meant to create a remedy of oversight over 
the regulatory agency's own supervisory conduct. 
.. 
No decision was given in this first case because 
the case was eventually withdrawn following a 
joint declaration issued by the two parties on the 
13th j anuary 2000 . In their joint declaration , the 
minority shareholders declared that they accept-
ed the explanations given by the Exchange for the 
prolonged suspension that occurred. During the 
course of the proceedings , the Exchange had 
introduced new bye-laws to safeguard the inter-
ests of minority shareholders in the event of a 
possible de-listing. This step helped to safeguard 
the position of the minority shareholders who 
clearly feared a possible de-listing of their shares, 
a step which could have had a negative impact 
over the marketability and value of their shares. 
This case does not contribute any relevant devel-
opment to the rules governing directors , as it was 
instead focused on the performance of the regula-
tory agency. 
Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal 
decision · Case number 2: 
investigation into alleged insider dealing; proposed 
increase in share capital; competence of the Tribunal; 
the concept of unpublished price sensitive information 
of a precise nature; level of proof required 
Towards the end of 2000, the Malta Stock 
Exchange Tribunal concluded its first ever 
inquiry into an alleged instance of insider deal-
ing. The allegation concerned The Chairman of a 
local bank whose shares are listed on the Malta 
Stock Exchange. The Tribunal decided that the 
allegations were completely unfounded. The 
allegation arose from an interpretation of a series 
of circumstances related to an increase irr the 
company's share capital that had been agreed at a 
Board meeting, and the subsequent acquisition of 
a relatively small number of shares by the foreign 
corporate shareholder represented by the 
Chairman. 
The Tribunal has competence to investigate 
allegations of "alleged or suspected irregular 
practices in Exchange dealings". Noting that the 
I990 Act did not define this phrase, the Tribunal 
interpreted it as covering "all kinds of mischief 
and wrongdoings, be they great or small" , cer-
tainly including acts of insider dealing but not 
exclusively limited to them. The Tribunal noted 
that a specific law on insider dealing, adopted by 
Parliament in 1994, had produced a new defini-
tion of the offence, quite different from the origi-
nal definition introduced by the 1990 Act. The 
Tribunal reasoned that following the passage of 
the 1994 Act, it should apply the new definition 
of insider dealing given in the new Act. It noted 
the legal provision in the 1994 Act that only indi-
viduals could be found guilty of criminal insider 
dealing, but the Tribunal decided that it could 
still investigate corporate wrongdoing in relation 
to suspected irregular practices within the frame-
work of the 1990 Act. 
The Tribunal reasoned that the whole case 
before it depended on proof that there had been 
wrongful use of unpublished price sensitive 
information "of a precise nature" . If this aspect 
was not proven, the case fails. It found that no 
"concrete" information had been available at the 
time that the share purchases were made: "The 
information at the time was sketchy and far from 
complete.". The information then available was 
not such that if made public could have had a sig-
nificant impact on the price: " . . . the information 
relating to the rights issue available at the time 
the purchases were made was so scant that it 
could not have significantly effected the price of 
the (bank's) shares had it been made public. It is 
relevant to point out that the law uses the word 
significant, meaning that it is not concerned with 
trivial information which only slightly affects the 
price." 
The Tribunal concluded that that the persons in 
question had acted correctly, and that there were 
no sufficient grounds to justify further investigat-
ing the allegation. 
Decision taken by the Malta Stock Exchange 
Tribunal on the 6th October 2000 
Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal 
decision · Case number 3: 
decision on alleged insider dealing; announcement of 
a rights issue; announcement of profits; position of the 
director/ deputy-chairman of a listed company 
This case involved the same listed company as in 
Case no. 2. Here too the Council of the Malta 
Stock Exchange referred the case for consideration 
by the Tribunal, primarily to establish whether 
there was a prima facie case of insider dealing 
other irregular practice on the Exchange. The case 
related to the acquisition by a company director of 
shares in the company within the two-month so-
called "freeze period" prior to the announcement 
of the financial results at a board meeting. The 
question before the Tribunal was in simple terms 
whether the acquiring director was in possession 
of unpublished price sensitive information when 
he bought the shares and whether he had violated 
the two-month ban. The reason behind the ban is 
to establish a clear parameter to regulate share 
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dealings by directors during what may be consid-
ered a suspect period with the company about to 
reveal details of its financial performance. In this 
period, directors and other insiders may easily 
come across sensitive and significant information 
which may tempt directors and other insiders to 
make a quick kill or seek to avoid an imminent 
loss- a classical insider dealing scenario. 
The difficulty really concerned the announce-
ment of the board meeting when the company's 
financial results were to be disclosed. The original 
date indicated for such meeting was later moved 
forward. The result was that the deputy-chairman 
of the company bought the shares at a date that 
would have originally been outside the freeze peri-
od under the original date, but that eventually 
came within the prohibited period when the meet-
ing was eventually called for an earlier date than 
that announced. This caused some uncertainty as 
to the precise date when the two-month ban would 
start running. 
The Tribunal remarked that as a general rule, 
unless otherwise provided in some regulation, "a 
director of a company listed on the Exchange has 
the right to deal in shares of the company". It 
added that "a director should not be unnecessarily 
precluded from actively participating in the com-
pany in which he occupies the office of director by 
way of dealing in its shares." . The Tribunal 
explained that although, technically, the director 
had breached the bye-law in question, he had been 
misled ("zgwidat"). It therefore found no evidence 
of insider dealing or other irregular practice as the 
director in question could not have known, at the 
time of the transaction, that his acquisition had 
accidentally strayed into the prohibition period. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Tribunal sought 
evidence of actual practice from the listed public 
companies with regard to the calling of board 
meetings for the announcement of the financial 
results. In a somewhat surprising move, the 
Tribunal also proceeded to instruct the listed com-
panies, who were not party to the proceedings, to 
establish fixed dates for the holding of the board 
meetings where the financial results would be dis-
closed, and directed that such dates should under 
no circumstances be brought forward. In this 
manner, the Tribunal sought to achieve certainty 
as to when the two-month prohibition period was 
to start running. 
It is arguable whether the Tribunal had the 
power under the 1990 Act to issue the latter direc-
tive, which is of a regulatory nature and would 
appear to be more properly exercisable by the reg-
ulatory authority itself, namely the Council as the 
listing authority. It may have been more formally 
correct for the Tribunal send it as a recommenda-
tion to the Council for implementation by way of 
a bye-law or some other manner. 
Proposed a mendments to the 
Malta St oc k Exchange Act 1990 
During the course of a public seminar organ-
ised by the Malta Stock Exchange some months 
ago , the Council of the Exchange announced a 
set of legislative reform proposals it was submit-
ting to Government. These include doing away 
with the Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal, which 
has been the subject of this paper. In its stead, 
the Council was proposing to extend the compe-
tence of the existing Financial Services Tribunal 
also to regulatory decisions taken by the 
Council, in the same manner applicable to the 
other competent authorities. Set up· under the 
Banking Act, the Financial Services Tribunal 
already enjoys jurisdiction which extends to 
decisions taken by the competent authorities 
under the Investment Services Act, the Financial 
Institutions Act and the insurance legislation. 
By extending it also to decisions taken by the 
Council of the Malta Stock Exchange, the overall 
position would be better streamlined and consis-
tent. 
By virtue of other proposed amendments, the 
Council would henceforth assume responsibility 
for investigating alleged cases of insider dealing 
on the Exchange, rather than refer them to the 
Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal as at present. (It 
may be predicted that should in the future the 
current responsibilities of the Council should be 
assumed by a single financial services regulatory 
body, then such oversight responsibilities would 
be transferred accordingly.) It was also revealed 
that a series of new offences would be recognized 
in the Insider Dealing Act 1994 which currently 
only captures strictly insider dealing offences. 
This shall now punish various forms of market 
abuse including market manipulation, spreading 
of false rumours and creating a false market in 
listed shares. 
(This article reflects solely the author's personal 
opinion, and does not represent the views of any insti-
tution or body. Some of the views expressed in this 
article have already appeared in an earlier article by 
the same writer, "The Junctions and first two decisions 
of the Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal ", published in 
The Company Lawyer, Vol 22 No 8, August 2001 , 
Sweet and Maxwell) 
The Hccountant 33 
